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NOTES
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.:
Emblem of the Struggle Between Citizens' First Amendment
Rights and States' Regulatory Interests in Election Issues
Populist and Progressive Era distrust of corporate interests and
political parties stimulated enthusiasm for direct legislation-the
citizen-initiated political tools of initiative, referendum, and recall. 1
Political reformers in the early twentieth century, acting on idealistic
notions of pure participatory democracy symbolized in eighteenth-
century New England town meetings, brought direct legislation to
more than one-third of the nation's jurisdictions by 1918.2 After a
1. See David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 13, 14-15 (1995). An initiative is a citizen-
initiated statute or constitutional amendment; proponents collect a certain number of
voters' signatures to qualify the initiative for the election ballot. See id. at 13. Voters then
choose to enact or reject the proposed legislation. See id. Moreover, initiatives are
subdivided into two types: direct and indirect. Direct initiatives that qualify through a
sufficient number of voter signatures appear on an election ballot for voters to consider.
In contrast, indirect initiatives that garner enough voter support go first to the state
legislature for consideration. If the legislature rejects the proposition or does not act on it
within a specified time, then the initiative appears on the next election ballot. States may
allow direct initiatives, indirect initiatives, or both. See id. at 29, 35; Julian N. Eule,
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1510-12 (1990). A popular
referendum is a review of a bill just passed by the legislature; as with the initiative, citizens
collect signatures to enable voters to decide the fate of the new statute. See Magleby,
supra, at 14. The popular referendum is distinct from a referendum called by elected
legislators for state constitutional amendments or other narrow purposes; this latter form
is not considered direct legislation. See Magleby, supra, at 14. Finally, in a recall, citizens
gather signatures in an attempt to force a vote on whether a particular elected official
should remain in office. See PHILIP L. DUBOIs & FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY
INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS, AND COMPARISONS 7-8 (1998).
2. See DAvID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 21-25 (1984); Magleby, supra note 1, at 15-16;
Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REv. 11,
15, 18 (1997).
Most of the 25 jurisdictions that have some form of direct legislation adopted it
during the early twentieth-century Progressive Era, which inherited aspects of the late
nineteenth-century Populist philosophy that "government would ... become a function of
men's daily lives only after direct democracy had dissolved a distant, corrupt government."
ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877-1920, at 84 (1967). Progressive
leaders called for strict antitrust laws and other regulations to rein in large corporations'
political activities and worked to incorporate legislative tools of initiative, referendum,
and recall into the political process. See id. at 180. For other commentaries on direct
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period of relative dormancy in the mid-twentieth century, direct
legislation has become increasingly popular in the century's final
three decades, as voters often have expressed dissatisfaction with the
governance of elected leaders The initiative process, however, has
not lived up to idealists' expectations Commentators have criticized
the process on a number of grounds: the complex initiative voting
process is biased against the poorly educated,5 a significant number of
democracy in the Progressive Era, see THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 38-59 (1989); DUBOIs & FEENEY,
supra note 1, at 15-18.
Of course, it would be inaccurate to characterize Progressive Era reformers as
achieving, or even attempting to achieve, an ideal society for all. Some initiatives of the
period infringed on the rights of minority groups. See Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (striking down an Oregon
citizen-initiated constitutional amendment requiring all school-age children, including
Catholic-school students, to attend only public schools); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225,
232-33 (1923) (upholding a California citizen-initiated statute barring certain aliens from
leasing land).
Most states west of the Mississippi allow for direct legislation, while most states
east of the river do not. See Persily, supra, at 18-21. One theory for this phenomenon is
that western states, which entered the union later than their eastern counterparts, were
more distant from James Madison's admonitions against pure democracy and factions and,
therefore, were more willing to incorporate new political structures, such as direct
legislation, into their nascent constitutions. See Persily, supra, at 20-21; see also THE
FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (discussing problems of pure democracy and
factionalism).
Twenty-four states and the District of Columbia allow some type of direct
legislation. See DUBOIs & FEENEY, supra note 1, at 2. The constitutional provisions of
the 24 states are ALASKA CONST. art. XI, §§ 1-8; ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, §§ 1-2;
ARK. CONST. amend. VII; CAL. CONST. art. II, §§ 8-10; COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1; FLA.
CONST. art. XI, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3; ME. CONST. art.
IV, Pt. 1, § 1, Pt. 3, §§ 17-20; MASS. CONST. amend. art. 48; MICH. CONST. art. II, § 9, art.
XII, § 2; MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273; MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 49-51; MONT. CONST. art.
III, §§ 4-6, art. XIV, §§ 2,9-11; NEB. CONST. art. III, §§ 1-4; NEV. CONST. art. IX; N.D.
CONST. art. III, §§ 1-10; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 1-4; OR.
CONsT. art. IV, § 1; S.D. CONST. art. III, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1; WASH. CONST.
art. II, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. III, § 52. These states provide for direct legislation for
statutes, constitutional amendments, or both. See DuBoIs & FEENEY, supra note 1, at 28.
3. See CRONIN, supra note 2, at 5 (noting voters' recent use of recall initiatives to
oust governors from office); DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 1, at 1 (stating that in 1992,
through citizen-initiated petitions, voters in 13 states chose to place term limits on their
United States Congress members); MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 67 (citing statistics that
show increasing numbers of petitions for initiatives and referendums in recent decades).
4. See SHAUN BOWLER & TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES: OPINION,
VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 7-20 (1998) (outlining historical critiques of direct
democracy); CRONIN, supra note 1, at 70-77 (addressing the lack of voter competence on
ballot initiatives); Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 17, 17 (1997) (noting that special interest groups, not ordinary citizens,
control the initiative process).
5. See LAWRENCE K. GROSSMAN, THE ELECTRONIC REPUBLIC: RESHAPING
DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 141-42 (1995) (criticizing the complexity and
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initiatives have attempted to target minority groups, 6 and many
initiative supporters today are white, affluent, and highly educated 7
members of political action groups backed by large-moneyed interests
that capitalize on the burgeoning "initiative industry."8
overwhelming nature of ballot measures); MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 111 (reasoning that
less educated voters have difficulty understanding ballot questions and tend to rely instead
on candidates and political parties to represent their interests); Eule, supra note 1, at 1509,
1516-19 (noting that the 159-page 1988 California ballot initiative pamphlet sent to voters
was written at a college reading level and describing the deceptive wording in some ballot
propositions); Magleby, supra note 1, at 33 (citing statistics that show individuals with low
incomes or low levels of education are much less likely to vote on initiatives than
wealthier, better-educated individuals).
6. For example, in 1992, Oregon voters rejected Measure 9, a citizen-initiated
proposed constitutional amendment that would have condemned homosexuality. See
Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not "Republican Government": The
Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 19 (1993). Part of the proposal
stated that "[s]tate, regional and local governments ... shall assist in setting a standard for
Oregon's youth that recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism, and masochism as
abnormal, wrong, unnatural, and perverse and that these behaviors are to be discouraged
and avoided." Id. at 36 n.71; see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908
F. Supp. 755, 763, 786-87 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (striking down portions of California's
Proposition 187, which was approved through direct legislation and which denied
education and health care, among other things, to undocumented residents), reconsidered
in part, 997 F. Supp. 1244 (C.D. Cal. 1997); Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo.
1994) (en bane) (voiding on equal protection grounds Colorado's citizen-initiated
constitutional ban on gay rights), affd, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
7. See Richard B. Collins & Dale Osterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative:
Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 58 (1995); Peter Schrag,
California, Here We Come, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1,1998, at 20,31; cf Peter Schrag,
California's Elected Anarchy: A Government Destroyed by Popular Referendum,
HARPER'S, Nov. 1, 1994, at 50, 57 (noting that California's Proposition 13, which voters
passed in 1978, sharply reduced local property taxes at a time when the state was shifting
to a majority non-white school-age population).
8. See Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEx. L.
REV. 1845, 1847-49 (1999) (documenting widespread use of large sums of money in
initiative campaigns); Daniel Hayes Lowenstein & Robert M. Stern, The First Amendment
and Paid Initiative Petition Circulators: A Dissenting View and a Proposal, 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 175, 176 (1989) (arguing that the cost of qualifying an initiative has resulted
in wealthy interest groups replacing volunteer-based groups); Magleby, supra note 1, at 24
(describing the professionalization of the initiative process); David S. Broder, Collecting
Signatures for a Price, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1998, at Al (citing that signature-gathering
firms participate in 90% of successful petition drives); Bruce Finley & Peggy Lowe,
Colorado Takes the Initiative, DENV. POST, Aug. 4, 1998, at Al (noting that Colorado
initiative campaign spending exceeded $10 million in 1994); Dan Morain, 1996 Expected to
Be Boom Year for Initiatives, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1995, at Al (reporting that groups may
spend $50 million on California initiatives and counter-initiatives related to proposed
statutes intended to limit plaintiffs' lawyers' fees and restrict rights to sue in automobile
accident and stockholder suits); David Schaefer, Stadium Foes Chide Allen for Not Voting,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 28, 1997, at BI (describing a $3 million initiative campaign for a
new sports stadium).
Another problem with direct legislation is its purported violation of the
Guarantee Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to
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In an attempt to rein in the excesses of direct legislation, states
use statutory or constitutional provisions to regulate the ballot-
petitioning process, through which supporters of proposed initiatives
and referendums attempt to attain the requisite number of voter
signatures to earn the measures a place on the election ballots for
voter consideration.9  Initiative petitioners, however, have a
constitutionally protected right to engage in political speech.10 State
regulations reflect an attempt to negotiate the uneasy tension
between citizens' First Amendment rights and states' interests in
protecting the voting rights of its citizens." In Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.,12 the Supreme Court invalidated
three Colorado provisions regulating ballot-petition circulators-
volunteers or paid employees who approach voters for the required
signatures-holding that the statutes violated the circulators' First
Amendment rights to free speech. 3 This ruling may invalidate many
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... "). Not long after the
onset of direct legislation, the United States Supreme Court dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction under the political question doctrine a claim that the Guarantee Clause voided
a statute enacted via initiative. See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118,
135, 151 (1912) (holding that political branches, not the judiciary, should determine
whether states provide a republican form of government). For a discussion of the
relationship between the Guarantee Clause and initiatives, see Akhil Reed Amar, The
Central Meaning of Republican Government. Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the
Denominator Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 749, 756-59 (1994) (concluding that the
Guarantee Clause does not prohibit direct democracy); Jesse H. Choper, Observations on
the Guarantee Clause-As Thoughtfully Addressed by Justice Linde and Professor Eule, 65
U. COLO. L. REV. 741, 747 (1994) (concluding that state courts, through adherence to
"republican lawmaking," may curb majoritarian excesses of the initiative process); Linde,
supra note 6, at 19-20 (asserting that state officials have a duty to examine direct
democracy in light of the Guarantee Clause, notwithstanding the Pacific States holding).
9. See Magleby, supra note 1, at 21.
10. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421-22 (1988) (determining that initiative
petition circulators engage in "core political speech" protected by the First Amendment).
11. See, e.g., id. at 421-22 (voiding Colorado's ban on payment of initiative signature
gatherers as an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights of political
expression); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-90 (1983) (striking down an Ohio
election law as unnecessarily trenching upon First Amendment voting and associational
rights of candidates and supporters); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973)
(upholding a challenged New York election law as preserving the State's interest in
preventing election violations); see also infra notes 112-17, 141-47, 148-60 (discussing
Rosario, Anderson, and Meyer, respectively).
12. 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999). For newspaper coverage of the ruling, see Joan Biskupic,
High Court Rejects Curbs on Ballot Initiatives, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1999, at Al; Linda
Greenhouse, Court Turns Back an Effort to Limit Ballot Initiatives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13,
1999, at Al; Howard Pankratz, Court Strikes Down Colo. Petition Curbs, DENY. POST,
Jan. 13, 1999, at Al.
13. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 639, 649.
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other states' regulations of direct legislation. 4
This Note reviews the facts of Buckley, its lower court history,
the Supreme Court's holding, and the Court's reasoning on each of
the three provisions.' 5 The Note then explains the line of cases that
preceded Buckley, focusing on the level of scrutiny that the Court
applied in each case.16 Next, the Note discusses the Court's standard
in Buckley for evaluating Colorado's election provisions.' It then
considers the potential effects of Buckley on the initiative process.'
Finally, the Note offers a solution to the problem of providing voters
with information about proponents' expenditures while protecting the
rights of direct legislation circulators. 19
Responding to the increasing prevalence of paid petition
circulators in the state initiative process,20 the Colorado General
Assembly in 1993 enacted Senate Bill 93-135,21 which amended
certain laws and added others to regulate the state's initiative and
referendum ballot-petitioning procedures.' In response to the bill's
14. See id. at 660-62 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (contending that Buckley may
jeopardize election laws in 21 states, plus the District of Columbia); see also Howard
Fischer, Petition Circulators Needn't Be on Voter Rolls, ARiz. DAILY STAR, Apr. 14, 1999,
at 3B (reporting that Buckley voids Arizona's circulator registration requirement); David
G. Savage, Justices Ease Limits on Ballot Initiatives, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at A3
(predicting "more and costlier ballot campaigns in California").
15. See infra notes 20-104 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 105-91 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 192-205 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 206-08 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
20. See Savage, supra note 14, at A3. Paid circulators have been working in Colorado
since a 1988 United States Supreme Court ruling voided a Colorado ban on paying
petition circulators. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,428 (1988); see also infra notes 148-
60 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and significance of Meyer).
21. S.B. 93-135,59th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1993).
22. See id; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-40-101 to -134 (West 1998). Senate Bill 93-
135 added three provisions that were subsequently challenged: (1) a provision requiring
circulators to be at least 18 years old, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-112(1); (2) a
requirement that circulators wear badges, id § 1-40-112(2); and (3) a mandate that
petition proponents submit monthly disclosure reports, id. § 1-40-121(2). See American
Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 870 F. Supp. 995, 997 (D. Colo. 1994), affjd in
part and rev'd in part, 120 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1997), affd sub nor. Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999).
The Colorado General Assembly, as part of a routine practice for its enactments,
included a "safety clause" at the end of Senate Bill 93-135 to protect its provisions from
attack by popular referendums. The safety clause states that "tflhe general assembly
hereby finds, determines, and declares that this act is necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, and safety." S.B. 93-135, 59th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.,
§ 11(Colo. 1993); American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 998, 1005.
Because of the General Assembly's routine attachment of safety clauses, no citizen-
initiated referendums have appeared on Colorado ballots since 1932. See Collins &
2000]
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passage, the American Constitutional Law Foundation (ACLF),21 a
non-profit public interest group active in ballot petitioning, and
several initiative activists 4 filed suit in federal court. They challenged
the constitutionality of certain ballot-petition restrictions,25 including
requirements that ballot-initiative circulators be registered voters,26
that each circulator wear a badge identifying the circulator both by
name and by paid or volunteer status,27 and that initiative proponents
disclose to Colorado the names and addresses of all paid circulators
and the amounts paid to each.8 The ACLF claimed that these
Osterle, supra note 7, at 65 n.76. For examples of other Colorado statutes with safety
clauses, see H.B. 98-1267, 61st Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., § 21 (Colo. 1998); H.B. 98-1325, 61st
Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess., § 20(Colo. 1998); S.B. 97-1, 61st Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., § 6(Colo. 1997);
S.B. 95-1, 60th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., § 4 (Colo. 1995); S.B. 93-136, 59th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.,
§10 (Colo. 1993).
Prior to bringing suit in Buckley, the plaintiffs moved to enjoin Colorado from
attaching the safety clause to Senate Bill 93-135 so that the plaintiffs could initiate a
referendum on it. The district court denied the plaintiffs' motion, and the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 998, 1005; affd,
American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, No. 93-1274, 1994 WL 387872, at *1-
2 (10th Cir. July 22, 1994) (unpublished opinion).
23. In this Note, ACLF denotes the plaintiffs, that is, both the organization and the
individuals who brought suit.
24. Nine individual plaintiffs joined the ACLF in the suit. They included Bill Orr,
executive director of the ACLF, who was not registered to vote; William David Orr, a
minor who wished to participate in ballot petitioning; David Aitken, chairman of the
Colorado Libertarian Party; Jack Hawkins and Craig Eley, labor activists who have sought
to change Colorado's workers' compensation laws through the initiative process; and Jon
Baraga, a state coordinator for the Colorado Hemp Initiative, a group aiming to legalize
marijuana in the state. See American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 997;
Brief for Respondents David Aitken, Jon Baraga, and Bill Orr, as the Parent and
Guardian of William David Onf, to the U.S. Supreme Court at *2-6, 1998 WL 328332,
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999) (No. 97-930).
25. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 997. The plaintiffs
filed the suit in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, claiming
deprivation of their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. 1997); American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 997. Senate Bill
93-135 was the origin of some, but not all, of the challenged provisions. For example, a
1980 voter-approved constitutional amendment, not Senate Bill 93-135, instituted the
registration requirement. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(6) (requiring that registered
electors sign a ballot-petition affidavit); American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 870 F.
Supp. at 999 (detailing the ratification of the 1980 amendment).
26. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-112(1) (West 1998).
27. See id. § 1-40-112(2). In addition, the statute required each paid circulator badge
to include the name and telephone number of the circulator's employer. See id
28. See id § 1-40-121(1). The provision obliged circulators to submit this information
to the secretary of state along with the petition. See id The provision also required each
circulator to submit the county in which the circulator is registered to vote and the amount
the circulator receives for each petition signature. See id Moreover, the statute required
the proponents of each petition to submit monthly reports to the secretary of state
providing the proponents" names, names and addresses of paid circulators, the name of the
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provisions violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment right to free
speech because the provisions not only discouraged potential
signature gatherers from participating in the petition process, but also
diminished the possibility that petitions would garner sufficient votes
to get on election ballots.2 9 Both of these effects, the ACLF argued,
served to decrease the quantity of political speech in Colorado. 0
The federal district court invalidated the badge requirement and
parts of the disclosure requirement.3' The court applied strict scrutiny
to these provisions on the grounds that they restricted "core political
speech"32 and found that the provisions were not narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling state interest.33 The court, however, upheld the
voter registration requirement 34 because it had been adopted by a
proposed ballot measure, and the amount paid and owed to each paid circulator for the
month. See id. § 1-40-121(2).
29. See Brief for Respondents American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., Craig
Eley, Jack Hawkins, Lonnie Haynes, and Alden Kautz, to the U.S. Supreme Court at *13,
1998 WL 331184, Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. (No. 97-930).
30. See id.
31. See American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 870 F. Supp. 995, 1000,
1002-03 (D. Colo. 1994). The court struck down sections 1-40-112(2), -121(1), and -121(2)
of the Colorado Revised Statutes. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text
(describing each section).
32. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 1002. The phrase "core
political speech" derives from Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (per curiam)
("[Campaign] contributions and expenditures are at the very core of political speech
.... "). For a discussion of Valeo, see infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
33. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 1002-03. Colorado
argued that the badges allowed the public to identify circulators who propound deliberate
falsehoods in attempts to garner signatures, but the district court responded that
inaccuracies in political speech are common and do not necessarily constitute criminal
fraud and that existing criminal penalties for violations of ballot-petition regulations
already address the state's concern. See id. at 1002. Colorado further claimed that the
badge requirement helps the public to determine if a petition has sufficient grassroots
support. See id. The court disposed of this contention by noting that the existing
requirement that the number of signatures equal a percentage of the number of voters in
the previous election for secretary of state adequately ensures grassroots support. See id.
Critics assert that in the modern era of paid petitioners, the number of signatures a
petition garners does not necessarily indicate public support; it may merely indicate the
number of circulators the petition proponent hired to get the signatures. See Lowenstein
& Stern, supra note 8, at 202. For examples of the excesses of the petition industry, see
supra note 8.
The State asserted the need for disclosure requirements to attain the same two
goals: prevention of fraud and determination of the level of grassroots support. See
American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 1003. The court upheld
provisions that required petition proponents to disclose the amount of money they pay
circulators, but struck down requirements that proponents identify paid circulators,
noting, "What is of interest is the payor, not the payees." Id.
34. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-112(1) (West 1998) (detailing the registration
requirement).
2000]
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voter-approved constitutional amendment in 198035 and because the
United States Constitution does not mandate initiatives or
referendums at the state level. 6 Accordingly, the district court held
that the registration provision should not be subject to any level of
scrutiny.37 The district court also upheld three other requirements
challenged by the plaintiffs: that circulators be at least eighteen years
old, that circulators submit an affidavit attesting to the validity of the
initiative petition, and that the petition circulation period be limited
to six months.3
Both parties appealed the ruling to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,39 which affirmed the district court in all
aspects save one: the constitutionality of the requirement that
circulators be registered voters.1 The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
absence of a constitutional right to the petition process does not
license Colorado to restrict core political speech in violation of the
First Amendment.41 The court then determined that this exclusion of
substantial numbers of Colorado residents42 from the process of direct
legislation not only prevented them from participating in political
speech, but also reduced the number of petition circulators. This
exclusion, in turn, diminished the possibility that petitions would
garner enough signatures to reach the ballot.43 The Tenth Circuit
35. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 1002; see also
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1, cl. 6 (requiring that a registered elector sign a ballot-petition
affidavit).
36. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 870 F. Supp. at 1002.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 1003-05. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on these
three provisions. See American Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092,
1099-1101 (10th Cir. 1997). The Supreme Court denied the ACLF's cross-petition
appealing the Tenth Circuit's ruling that upheld these requirements. See American
Constitutional Law Found., Inc. v. Buckley, 522 U.S. 1113 (1998) (mem.); see also COLO.
CONST. art. V, § 1(6) (stating the affidavit requirement); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-40-
112(1) (stating the age requirement), -111(2) (detailing the affidavit requirement), -108(1)
(noting the time limit).
39. See American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 120 F.3d at 1092.
40. See id. at 1100; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-112(1).
41. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1100.
42. Colorado reported that at least 400,000 of its eligible residents were not registered
voters as of 1994. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1100. The
Supreme Court, in its opinion, cited statistics showing that 620,000 eligible Colorado
voters were not registered at the time of the trial, and in 1997, more than 35% of eligible
electors, some 964,000 people, were not registered. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 643 n.15
(citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 282 tbl. 453 (1993); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 289 tbl.
453 (1997)).
43. See American Constitutional Law Found, Inc., 120 F.3d at 1100.
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ruled that the registration requirement had a "discriminatory
effect."'  Accordingly, the court applied strict scrutiny and held that
Colorado failed the test, reasoning that a residency requirement
would be more narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interest in
policing the direct legislation system.45
Colorado appealed the Tenth Circuit's invalidation of the
registration, identification, and disclosure restrictions on petition
circulators to the Supreme Court.4 6 The State argued that circulators
play two roles: they act as advocates for the initiative by engaging in
core political speech, and they are administrators of the electoral
system who regulate the petition process by collecting valid
signatures. 47 Colorado argued that, because its regulations addressed
the administrative aspect of the circulators' job and did not aim at
First Amendment rights of political speech, the Court should apply a
standard lower than that of strict scrutiny.'
In an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the majority
rejected the argument that circulators administer the electoral
process49 and addressed only the advocacy portion of the circulators'
job.50  Applying an unlabeled strict scrutiny test to the three
challenged provisions,51 the Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit in
holding that all three regulations violated the First Amendment.52
According to the Court, ballot-petition circulation is " 'core political
speech,' because it involves 'interactive communication concerning
political change.' 3 First Amendment protection for this kind of
44. Id
45. See idL
46. See Petitioner's Brief to the U.S. Supreme Court at *1, 1998 WL 221384, Buckley
(No. 97-930).
47. See U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript of Oral Argument at *7, *21, 1998 WL
731585, Buckley (No. 97-930).
48. See id. at *7-8, *21-22.
49. The Court stated that its opinion should not "be read to suggest that initiative-
petition circulators are agents of the State. Although circulators are subject to state
regulation and are accountable to the State for compliance with legitimate controls, ...
circulators act on behalf of themselves or the proponents of ballot initiatives." Buckley,
119 S. Ct. at 642 n.11.
50. See id. at 639-49.
51. Notably, the Court did not explicitly state which level of scrutiny it applied. This
omission led Justice Thomas to write separately, concurring in the judgment. See Buckley,
119 S. Ct. at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); infra notes 73-79 and
accompanying text (detailing Justice Thomas's concurrence). Despite the lack of a label,
the Court clearly purported to apply strict scrutiny, a test that required Colorado's statutes
to be "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 642
n.12.
52. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640-42.
53. Id at 639 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,422 (1988)).
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interaction is "'at its zenith.' "I The Court held that Colorado's
"substantial interests" are insufficient to warrant the restrictions. 55
In ruling on the constitutionality of the restrictions on the
petition process, the Court first examined Colorado's requirement
that petition circulators be registered to vote in the state. 6 The Court
agreed with the ACLF that the requirement restricted core political
speech in two ways. First, it decreased the quantity of political speech
by severely diminishing the number of persons eligible to circulate
petitions. Second, it decreased the possibility that initiatives' political
message would get to voters by reducing the chances that organizing a
proposed initiative or referendum would acquire the requisite
number of signatures to put the measure on an election ballot.5 7
Furthermore, the Court maintained that Colorado failed to
demonstrate that the requirement served a compelling state interest.5 8
Colorado had argued that the registration provision did not severely
burden political speech because registering to vote is easy. The
Court, however, determined that the decision not to register could be
a conscious political choice and that such an expression of protest is
worthy of First Amendment protection.5 9 The State also had argued
that the provision allowed Colorado to subpoena circulators who
violate election laws. The Court replied that the affidavit
requirement upheld in the lower courts addressed that concern by
requiring circulators to submit their addresses.6 The Court stated
54. Id. at 640 (quoting Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425).
55. Id- at 648. The Court's use of the phrase "substantial interests" implies that it may
actually have applied something less that strict scrutiny. For a discussion, see infra notes
203-05 and accompanying text.
56. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 642-45.
57. See id. at 643-44.
58. See id. at 644.
59. See id. The Court also gave weight to trial testimony that tended to show that
non-registered electors, often those " 'not involved in normal partisan politics,' " are
among those who typically support initiative and referendum petition drives. Id. at 643
(quoting trial testimony of initiative proponent Paul Grant).
60. See id. at 644. Colorado explained in its brief that, from the adoption of the
initiative in 1910 until a constitutional amendment in 1980, the state required signatures
from eight percent of the voters for secretary of state in the previous election, but required
only that signers be eligible to vote rather than registered. See Petitioner's Brief to the
U.S. Supreme Court at *33-34, 1998 WL 221384, Buckley (No. 97-930). Because of the
difficulty involved in determining who was eligible to cast a ballot, voters ratified a
constitutional amendment in 1980 that required both signers and circulators to be
registered voters. See id. The pool of eligible signers and circulators decreased, and to
compensate, the amendment lowered the signature requirement to five percent. See id.
If the ban on Colorado's registration requirement results in increasing numbers of
petitions qualifying for the ballot, legislators may increase the number of signatures
required for qualification in the interests of protecting voters from overwhelmingly long
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that a residency requirement for circulators might be constitutional,
but did not address the issue because it was not raised on appeal.61
The Court also rejected Colorado's provision that petition
circulators wear identification badges, relying on trial testimony that
requiring nametags deterred potential circulators from participating
in the petition process.62 The Court stated that the requirement
obligated circulators to identify themselves when they petitioned
voters for signatures "at the precise moment when the circulator's
interest in anonymity is greatest." 63 Colorado argued that the badges
were necessary to allow the public to identify circulators who act
improperly.' The Court determined that the existing requirement
that circulators sign an affidavit attesting to the validity of the petition
after they collect signatures was a better means to serve Colorado's
interest in deterring circulator fraud. The affidavit, the Court
reasoned, temporally separates the circulators' act of identification
from the act of petitioning.65
Finally, the Court struck down part of Colorado's petition-
ballots. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 1847. Such an increase would favor petition
proponents who hire circulators over proponents who rely on volunteers. See id. (noting
that "well-compensated political consultants" are increasingly necessary to qualify an
initiative for the ballot); Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 8, at 218-19 (describing how the
initiative industry tends to make it more difficult for volunteer-based initiative campaigns
to gain ballot access).
61. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 645. Subsequently, the Court has declined to hear a
challenge to a Maine requirement that petition circulators be state residents. See Hart v.
Gwadowsky, 715 A.2d 165, 168 (Me. 1998) (applying strict scrutiny and upholding a
residency requirement), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1028 (1999).
62. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 645-46. At trial, one petition organizer testified that the
badge requirement" 'limited the number of people willing to work for us,' "while another
described harassment he experienced while circulating and stated that for some
circulators, "'[w]ith their name on a badge, it makes them afraid.'" Id- (quoting trial
testimony of respondent Jon Baraga).
All nine Justices agreed that the identification badge requirement was
unconstitutional. See id at 645-46; id. at 651 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id.
at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 662
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). The Tenth Circuit also held the badge requirement
unconstitutional because it required circulators to display their names. See id. at 645.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Tenth Circuit considered the requirements that the
badge identify the circulator's volunteer or paid status and, if an employee, the name and
telephone number of the employer. See id. at 646.
63. Id. at 646. At oral argument, however, one of the Justices hinted that a badge that
only displayed a circulator's paid or volunteer status might be upheld as constitutional.
See U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript of Oral Argument at *26-27, 1998 WL 731585,
Buckley (No. 97-930).
64. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 645.
65. See id at 646; see also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-111(2) (West 1998)
(detailing the affidavit requirement).
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disclosure requirements.66 In affirming the lower courts, the Supreme
Court invalidated provisions requiring identification of paid
circulators and the amounts paid to each, but left intact the
requirement that petition proponents reveal the amounts they paid
for each voter signature.67 Colorado argued that the disclosure
requirements were vital to its interest in reining in the tendency of
moneyed interests to exert excessive control over the initiative
petition process.6 The Court stated, however, that the upheld
disclosure provisions requiring proponents to identify themselves and
their spending levels adequately supplied Colorado voters with the
information they needed to form an opinion about initiative
sponsors.69 The majority reasoned that publicly disclosing the names
of paid circulators and their earnings would not aid voters because
the reports would not be immediately available to voters at the
moment circulators approached them.70  The Court rejected
Colorado's argument that ballot initiatives are susceptible to the
"quid pro quo" corruption that exists in candidate elections and
concluded that the petition stage of the initiative process is less likely
to incur fraud than the ballot stage.71 The Court determined that
Colorado had not demonstrated sufficiently the benefit that would
accrue from further identifying each paid circulator and the amount
paid to each.72
Justice Thomas wrote separately and concurred only in the
judgment, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment in part and
dissented in part, and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented separately."
In concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas criticized the majority
because he believed its opinion applied something less than strict
scrutiny in evaluating Colorado's three petition regulations.74 He
outlined the framework that the Court had developed in previous
66. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 646-48.
67. See id. at 647.
68. See idL
69. See id.
70. See id- at 647 n.22, 648.
71. Id at 648.
72. See id at 647.
73. See idL at 649-53 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 653-59
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 659-62
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
74. See id at 649, 653 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). The majority
responded, "Our decision is entirely in keeping with the 'now-settled approach' that state
regulations 'impos[ing] "severe burdens" on speech ... [must] be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest.'" Id at 642 n.12 (quoting id. at 649 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment)) (alterations in original).
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cases to determine the validity of state election laws under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.' According to Justice Thomas, the
Court consistently has applied strict scrutiny to laws that regulate
"core political speech" and has required that these laws be "narrowly
tailored to serve ... compelling governmental interest[s]."76 If a law
severely burdens voting or associational rights, the Court applies
strict scrutiny, as it does with restrictions on core political speech.77
Lesser burdens on the right to vote or to associate trigger a less
exacting standard of scrutiny, however, and states' regulatory
interests usually justify those restrictions.78  Justice Thomas
considered each of Colorado's restrictions in turn, concluding that
each required, and failed, strict scrutiny.79
Concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, Justice
O'Connor acknowledged the circulator's dual role as advocate and
administrator 80 and emphasized the distinction between strict
scrutiny, which is appropriate for "regulations directly burdening the
one-on-one, communicative aspect of petition circulation," and the
"less exacting standard of review" appropriate for indirect burdens on
speech.81 Justice O'Connor asserted that if a state's regulation
primarily affects the administrative portion of the circulator's job,
then the Court should apply the less exacting test.' Applying this
distinction, Justice O'Connor dissented from the portion of the
majority opinion that invalidated the registration requirement.'m
75. See id at 649-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
76. Id at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Timmons v. Twin Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1997); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992);
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,788-90 (1983)).
77. See id at 649-50 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
78. See id at 649 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
79. See id at 651-53 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas's
reasoning in striking down the badge and registration requirements largely paralleled the
majority's rationale. See id. at 650-52 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Thomas, however, did not consider the disclosure requirements to severely burden
political speech. See id. at 652 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Instead, he
determined that compelled disclosure alone, in an election case, triggers strict scrutiny.
See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64,
96 (1976) (per curiam)). According to Justice Thomas, Colorado had not demonstrated a
compelling interest in obtaining the information that the requirement mandated. See id.
80. See id. at 653-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
81. See id. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
82. See id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
83. See id at 654-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
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Because she believed that the ACLF had shown neither that the
registration requirement had diminished the number of initiatives on
the ballot, nor that a significant number of potential circulators had
refused to register as a political protest, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the requirement only indirectly restricted face-to-face
communication.84  The appropriate test, according to Justice
O'Connor, was the less exacting "review for reasonableness."85
Colorado showed a reasonable interest in petitioner registration as a
means of enhancing its ability to enforce laws against circulation
fraud, Justice O'Connor concluded, so she would have upheld the
requirement. 6
Justice O'Connor also would have allowed Colorado to retain its
petition disclosure provision, reasoning that the restriction merited
less exacting scrutiny because it only indirectly affected face-to-face
petitioning.' Justice O'Connor relied on record testimony suggesting
that paid circulators had been less scrupulous than their volunteer
counterparts8 and reasoned that voters' ability to evaluate
circulators' sincerity would be heightened if voters knew whether
circulators were paid and, if so, how much.89 Justice O'Connor also
asserted that the affidavit requirement is an inadequate substitute
because affidavits are due once the circulation process is complete,
long after the voters have decided whether to sign the petition."
Justice O'Connor wrote that Colorado had demonstrated not only
that the disclosure requirement was reasonable, 91 but that she would
have upheld the provision even under strict scrutiny.9
84. See id at 655-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Justice O'Connor was not convinced by what she considered to be weak and
equivocal testimony on the reasoning behind circulators' decisions not to register. See id.
85. Id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
86. See id. at 656 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
87. See il. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
88. See id. at 658 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); see also Magleby, supra note 1, at 23 (reporting that Colorado suffers more fraud
committed by paid circulators than by volunteers).
89. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 658 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
90. See id- (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
91. See id. at 656-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
92. See id. at 659 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part). Justice O'Connor's view that Colorado's interests survive strict scrutiny was based
on the Court's holding in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam)
(describing governmental interests that withstand exacting scrutiny). See Buckley, 119 S.
Ct. at 657-59. For further discussion of Buckley v. Valeo, see infra notes 134-40 and
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In a vigorous dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the
Court's invalidation of the registration and disclosure requirements,
lamenting that "in the name of the First Amendment, [the majority's
opinion] strikes down the attempt of a State to allow its own voters
(rather than out-of-state persons and political dropouts) to decide
what issues should go on the ballot."93 According to the Chief Justice,
the majority opinion implies that any statute that reduces the pool of
potential petition circulators or lessens the chance that an initiative
may reach an election ballot could be held unconstitutional.94
Although he did not specify a level of scrutiny for reviewing
Colorado's provisions, Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that he
would apply a less exacting standard than the majority.95
Registering to vote is not burdensome, according to the Chief
Justice, and the fact that registration is a requirement for candidates,
delegates, and other participants in electoral politics bolsters his
assertion that the registration requirement for circulators was
constitutional.96  He further argued that non-registration as an
expression or rejection of the political process applies only to a small
number of those who do not register.97 More importantly, in Chief
Justice Rehnquist's view, those few individuals, by eschewing the
political process, had waived their right to protest a prohibition
against circulating petitions, which, after all, may be signed only by
registered voters.98 The Chief Justice also expressed concern that
disenfranchised "convicted drug felons" would have a right to
circulate petitions under the Court's holding.99 Finally, the Chief
Justice argued that, because at the time of the holding no existing
Colorado law required that circulators be eligible to vote in the state,
accompanying text.
93. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 659 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting); see also Broder, supra note
8, at Al (reporting that petition circulators regularly violate California's residency
requirement for circulators).
94. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 661 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
95. See id. at 659 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that
"before today's decision, it appeared that under our case law a State could have imposed
reasonable regulations on the circulation of initiative petitions, so that some order could
be established over the inherently chaotic nature of democratic processes." Id
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
96. See id. at 660 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
97. See id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
98. See id. at 661 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
99. Id. at 660 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). In discussing this issue, Chief Justice
Rehnquist mentioned respondent Jon Baraga, a supporter of a movement to legalize
marijuana in Colorado. See id (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). This implication by
association seems problematic, because neither the Chief Justice nor any other Justice
cites any evidence linking Baraga to illegal activity.
2000]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the Court's decision effectively allows non-Coloradans to collect
signatures.1 0  Applying the majority's reasoning to circulators
working to place candidates on election ballots, Chief Justice
Rehnquist concluded that statutes in nineteen states and the District
of Columbia could be unconstitutional. 1 1
Chief Justice Rehnquist also maintained that the disclosure
requirement was constitutional because the affidavit requirement,
which the Tenth Circuit upheld, already destroyed circulators'
anonymity. °2 The disclosure requirement requested only one piece
of information that the affidavit did not: the amount paid to each
circulator. 03 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that this additional
requirement should not be enough to scuttle the entire disclosure
provision, which served "substantial interests" and withstood First
Amendment review."°
Although the Buckley majority did not identify explicitly its
analysis as strict scrutiny, 5 the Court's choice of a standard was
determinative of the constitutionality of the provisions in question.
This pattern is consistent with the body of case law developed over
the past thirty years. State electoral regulations that burden citizens'
First Amendment rights to engage in political speech warrant strict
scrutiny review and must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest. 06 In contrast, burdens on other constitutional rights,
such as the First Amendment right of association, do not necessarily
100. See id. at 660-61 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
101. See id. at 661 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting); see also id. at 661 n.3 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (listing relevant statutes in the 20 jurisdictions); supra note 14 (describing
Buckley's effects on other state election laws).
102. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 662 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
103. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
104. Id (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's choice of test).
106. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (ruling
that a prohibition on distributing anonymous handbills related to a ballot measure
trenches upon the right to political speech); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992)
(holding that a ban on campaign-related activity within 100 feet of polling place entrances
limits political speech but survives strict scrutiny); Austin v. Michigan, 494 U.S. 652, 654
(1990) (ruling that a Michigan prohibition on corporate expenditures on state election
campaigns restricts political expression but is sufficiently narrowly tailored to the state's
interests); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-23
(1989) (holding that a ban on primary endorsements by political parties limits political
speech); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (ruling that a prohibition on paying
ballot petition circulators is unduly restrictive of political speech); Term Limits Leadership
Council, Inc. v. Clark, 984 F. Supp. 470, 470-72 (S.D. Miss. 1997) (holding that both a
requirement for petition circulators to be registered voters and a ban on payment of
circulators on a per-signature basis unconstitutionally restrict political speech).
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warrant strict scrutiny review."° In cases regarding regulations that
do not restrict political speech, but rather address procedural or
administrative aspects of elections, the Court has fashioned a
balancing test to weigh citizens' rights against states' regulatory
interests.108 If a state's regulation severely burdens citizens' non-
speech rights, the Court subjects the regulation to strict scrutiny.0 9 If,
however, the regulation places merely "reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions""' on citizens' rights, the Court applies
a "review for reasonableness" test."'
The earliest of these cases recognized the importance of states'
interests in regulating elections. In Rosario v. Rockefeller,"2 the
Court applied a relaxed standard of review in upholding a New York
election law that prohibited electors who had not registered as party
members before the previous general election from voting in a
primary."' This provision required voters to affiliate with a party up
to eleven months before a primary election."4 Although it did not
explicitly identify its standard of scrutiny, the Rosario Court reasoned
that the New York time restriction was warranted because it had a
107. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) ("Petitioner proceeds from
the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must
be subject to strict scrutiny. Our cases do not so hold.").
108. See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434 (explaining a "flexible standard" test); Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1983) (enunciating the balancing test).
109. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981)
(using strict scrutiny in voiding the city's limit on contributions to groups supporting or
opposing ballot measures as violating of the First Amendment right to assemble); Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam) (purporting to apply strict scrutiny, yet
upholding the requirement of a campaign finance disclosure).
110. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
111. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part). In her opinion, Justice O'Connor implied that the "review for
reasonableness" was "akin to rational review." Id.; see also, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358, 364 (1997) (using a "flexible standard" test to uphold a
prohibition on candidate multiple-party ballot appearances); Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434
(applying a "flexible standard" in upholding a ban on write-in voting notwithstanding
voters' First Amendment rights of association); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)
(applying a balancing test to uphold a provision regulating candidate party affiliation);
Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (using an unlabeled relaxed standard in
upholding a restriction on voter registration); Biddulph v. Mortham, 89 F.3d 1491, 1493
(11th Cir. 1996) ("[S]tate initiative regulations ... that do not burden 'core political
speech,' are content-neutral, and do not disparately impact particular political viewpoints
are not subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment."); Taxpayers United for
Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 299 (6th Cir. 1993) (applying "rational
relationship" review to uphold Michigan's procedures to validate signatures on petitions).
112. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
113. See id. at 762.
114. See id. at 765 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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"particularized legitimate purpose" of preventing party raiding, in
which voters sympathetic to one party register with and vote in an
opposing party's primary, in an attempt to affect the election
outcome."-' Justice Powell dissented, arguing that the Court's choice
of standard "resembles the traditional equal protection 'rational
basis' test"" 6 and that prior case law required the Court to apply strict
scrutiny instead." 7
The Court decided a case the following term, however, that
called into question the scope of the Rosario holding. In Kusper v.
Pontikes,"8 the Court applied what appeared to be a higher level of
scrutiny in holding unconstitutional an Illinois law that required
voters to affiliate with a party twenty-three months before a
primary. 119 Illinois defended the provision on the same grounds as
New York had done in Rosario: prevention of party raiding.120 The
Court distinguished the Illinois provision from New York's law in
Rosario by determining that in Kusper the lengthy party affiliation
period "absolutely precluded" voters from participating in the
primary of their party of choice.'2 ' According to the majority, the
Illinois provision was not sufficiently tailored to prevent raiding.'2 In
dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the differences between the
New York and Illinois statutes did not warrant application of
different standards of review"z and advocated the "appropriately
115. Id. at 760.
116. Id at 767 (Powell, J., dissenting).
117. See id at 768 (Powell, J., dissenting). As examples of cases in which the Court
applied strict scrutiny, Justice Powell cited Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972)
(striking down a Tennessee law requiring citizens to reside in the state for one year and in
the county for three months before registering to vote because it did not further a
compelling state interest), and Kramer v. Union Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969)
(holding unconstitutional a requirement that school district electors be owners or lessees
of taxable property because the requirement does not promote a compelling state
interest).
118. 414 U.S. 51 (1973).
119. See id. at 60-61.
120. See id. at 59-60.
121. Id. at 60; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 30 (1976) (per curiam) (stating, in
reference to Rosario and Kusper, that "distinctions of degree become significant only
when they can be said to amount to differences in kind"); Craig M. Engle, Buckley over
Time: A New Problem with Old Contribution Limits, 24 J. LEGIs. 207, 211-12 (1998)
(noting that in Kusper, a difference of degree became a difference in kind: Rosario's
shorter waiting period fell on the constitutional side of the line, while the 23-month
waiting period in Kusper crossed the line into unconstitutional territory).
122. See Kusper, 414 U.S. at 58-59.
123. See id at 65 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This incongruity underscores what I
believe to be the potential mischief that results from an easy and all-too-ready resort to a
strict-scrutiny standard in election cases of this kind.").
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deferential approach" of the Rosario Court.2 4
The next year, in Storer v. Brown,' the Court further muddied
the waters by advocating a case-by-case analysis for evaluating state
regulation of election issues. 26 The Storer Court upheld a California
election law that required independent candidates to refrain from
affiliating with any qualified political party within one year prior to
the primary election. 27 Although the Court again did not delineate
explicitly the level of scrutiny it was applying, its reasoning more
closely matched the Rosario Court's test than Kusper's higher level of
scrutiny.m The Storer Court weighed the burdens on the candidates'
rights against California's need to provide "substantial regulation of
elections ... if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany
the democratic processes.' 1 29 The Court explicitly stated that it was
not implementing a "litmus-paper test"' 30  to determine the
constitutionality of election laws. Rather, it used a balancing test that
was a "'matter of degree' "13 and considered the totality of
circumstances surrounding citizens' and states' interests.' Thus,
Storer reconciled Rosario and Kusper by evaluating not only the kind
of state provisions at issue, but also the degree to which the state
regulations infringe on individuals' rights to vote or to run for
office. 33
Two years later, the Court's landmark campaign finance case,
Buckley v. Valeo,'" included a holding relevant to initiative petition
124. Ia at 63 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
125. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
126. See Richard Briffault, Issue Advocacy: Redrawing the Elections/Politics Line, 77
TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1767 (1999) (noting that Storer draws "fuzzy lines" and is an example
of a case in which the Court "has often expressed a preference for contextualized
approaches and balancing tests rather than per se rules"); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Lowering
the Compelling State Interest Hurdle, 53 N.C. L. REV. 430, 436-37 (1974) (observing that
the Storer Court established a strict scrutiny standard and then applied a lower standard
for California to meet).
127. See Storer, 415 U.S. at 726.
128. See id. at 730. In Buckley, Justice Thomas maintained that the Storer Court
applied strict scrutiny. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 650 & n.1 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment).
129. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 348 (1972)).
132. See id. (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,30 (1968)).
133. See id at 731-32 ("I[T]he [Kusper] Court did not retreat from Rosario ....
Although the 11-month requirement imposed in New York had been accepted as
necessary... the [Kusper] Court was unconvinced that the 23-month period established in
Illinois was an essential instrument to counter the evil at which it was aimed.").
134. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). This case will be referred to as "Valeo" to avoid
confusion with Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc.
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campaigns. The Court announced a standard of "exacting scrutiny"135
in reviewing statutory disclosure requirements of federal campaign
finance information, in light of the view that compulsory disclosure
may violate First Amendment rights of privacy of association and
belief.136  In Valeo, however, the Court balanced the federal
government's interests in deterring campaign corruption, detecting
violations of election laws, and providing voters with information
about the origin and expenditure of campaign money against the
encroachment on campaign contributors' constitutional rights to
privacy and free speech. 37 While the Court announced a standard of
exacting scrutiny, it applied a standard more akin to intermediate
scrutiny-requiring important interests achieved by substantially
related means.38  The Valeo Court also invoked the First
Amendment to strike down restrictions on campaign expenditures. 39
Reasoning that, in a modem society, candidates must spend money to
disseminate political speech effectively, the Court determined that a
spending limit "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed ... and the size of the
audience reached."'140
The Court returned to its Rosario and Storer line of reasoning in
Anderson v. Celebrezze,4' in which it announced a balancing test to
weigh the competing interests between candidate supporters and the
state. In Anderson, the Court held that Ohio's filing deadline for
presidential candidates violated the First Amendment associational
rights of Independent candidate John Anderson and his supporters.142
Nearly two months after the deadline, the candidate's boosters
presented the requisite number of petition signatures to place
Anderson on Ohio's November general election ballot.143 The State
135. Id at 64.
136. See id.
137. See id at 68. The Court stated that "[tihese are not insignificant burdens on
individual rights, and they must be weighed carefully against the interests which Congress
has sought to promote." Id. The Court required a "substantial relation between the
governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed." Id. at 64 (internal
references omitted).
138. In Buckley, Justice Thomas maintained that the Valeo Court actually had applied
a standard less rigorous than strict scrutiny. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 653 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 62 (1987) (arguing that the Valeo Court applied intermediate
scrutiny).
139. See Valeo, 424 U.S. at 58-59.
140. L at 19.
141. 460 U.S. 780,788-90 (1983).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 782.
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refused, citing Ohio's interests in fostering a stable political system,
equal treatment of all candidates, both party and non-party, and
adequate time for Ohio voters to evaluate candidates.1" The Court's
balancing test considered the First Amendment rights of Anderson
and his supporters against specific state interests in restricting those
rights.145 Justice Stevens, a consistent opponent of states' interests in
election-issue cases,'146 wrote the majority opinion rejecting each of
Ohio's purported interests as insubstantial when compared to the
voting and associational rights of Anderson's supporters. 47
In Meyer v. Grant,'" the Court applied strict scrutiny in a
unanimous decision striking down a Colorado ban on compensating
ballot-petition circulators. 49 In Meyer, a case upon which the Buckley
Court relied heavily, 50 the Court held that the Colorado law violated
the First Amendment rights of circulators and proponents to
communicate political speech.'5 ' The Court determined that ballot-
144. See id. at 796.
145. See id. at 789. The Buckley Court relied on the Anderson balancing test. See
Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 640-42.
146. See, e.g., Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 636 (joining the majority opinion against the state);
Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 370 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(dissenting from the majority holding for the state); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (joining opinion against state); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
442 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J.) (dissenting from holding for
state); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 217 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from holding for state); Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S.
214, 233 (1989) (joining opinion against state); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988)
(joining opinion against state); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 806 (joining opinion against state).
147. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796-806. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Anderson
parallels his dissent in Buckley in many respects, especially in his defense of state interests.
See icL at 806-23 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 659-62 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
148. 486 U.S. 414,420 (1988).
149. See id. at 428. The Colorado statute deemed payment of circulators a felony. See
id. at 417 (discussing COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-110 (West 1988) (repealed 1989)).
150. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 639, 642. Analysts of Meyer predicted some of the
ramifications of the ruling, including some of the issues raised in Buckley. See Lowenstein
& Stem, supra note 8, at 214. Under a strict interpretation of Meyer, any restrictions on
who may circulate would violate the First Amendment right to engage in core political
speech. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 8, at 214. Regulations on circulation may
violate the rights of "persons under eighteen, aliens, ... formerly convicted felons, and
others .... If saying that one individual may not be paid to circulate a petition infringes
freedom of speech, saying that another individual may not circulate a petition at all must
violate the First Amendment even more." Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 8, at 214.
151. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 428. Lower courts have interpreted broadly the holding in
Meyer. In LIMIT v. Maleng, 874 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Wash. 1994), a district court cited
the "clear mandate" of Meyer and voided a state statute banning payment of petition
circulators on a per signature basis. See LIMIT, 874 F. Supp. at 1141. Similarly, in a case
foreshadowing Buckley, a court struck down a registration requirement for circulators in
Term Limits Leadership Council v. Clark, 984 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D. Miss. 1997). The
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petition circulation is "core political speech15 2 because circulation
"involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a
discussion of the merits of the proposed change.1 53 Drawing from
the Court's reasoning in Valeo,154 and foreshadowing its analysis in
Buckley, the Meyer Court concluded that the Colorado provision
restricted speech both because the prohibition diminished the number
of circulators and because the ban consequently decreased the
likelihood that an initiative would gain enough signatures to be
placed on an election ballot.5 5 The Court rejected Colorado's
argument that the ban ensured that initiatives or referendums
circulators in this case were not only unregistered, they were also not residents of
Mississippi. See idL at 472.
152. Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422.
153. Id at 421. Commentators have questioned the validity of classifying petition
circulation as "core political speech." For example, Professors Lowenstein and Stem cite
a successful California petition drive coordinator who stated that "about 75 percent of the
people sign [a petition] when they're told to. 'Hell no, people don't ask to read the
petition and we certainly don't offer,' he added. 'Why try to educate the world when
you're trying to get signatures?'" Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 8, at 197 (quoting Carla
Lazzareschi Duscha, The Koupals' Petition Factory, 6 CAL. J. 83, 83 (1975)).
154. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 419 (describing the Tenth Circuit's analogy between issues
in Meyer and Valeo); see also supra notes 134-40 (discussing Valeo).
155. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422-23. Some commentators have suggested an alternative
theory that interprets the ban as affecting the collection of signatures rather then speech
because Colorado's statute did not prevent petition proponents from hiring advocates to
accompany volunteer circulators. See Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 8, at 210-11. For a
court opinion critical of this alternative theory, see Bernbeck v. Moore, 936 F. Supp. 1543,
1558-59 (D. Neb. 1996) (following Meyer in striking down Nebraska's petitioner
registration requirement).
Professors Lowenstein and Stem also argue that petition qualification
requirements do not exist to put as many initiatives on the ballot as possible; rather, they
serve to winnow out proposals that do not enjoy sufficient popular support. See
Lowenstein & Stern, supra note 8, at 210-11. They argue that allowing paid circulators in
Colorado would likely result in increasing numbers of qualified petitions, which in turn
would overwhelm voters at the ballot booth. See id Legislators likely would respond by
making the qualification process more difficult, for example, by reducing the amount of
time allowed for gathering signatures. See id This process increasingly will tend to favor
petition proponents who hire circulators over proponents who rely on volunteers. See id.
As an example of Buckley's furtherance of this trend, a successful Colorado petition
sponsor stated that the ruling will not result in a dramatic increase in petitions because of
the high cost of the process, while Colorado's Secretary of State noted the increasing
prevalence of "initiative corporations." Michael Romano, Ruling Not Expected to Boost
Initiatives, ROCKY MTN. NEWS (Denver, Colo.), Jan. 13,1999, at 18A.
For other examples of cases in which courts invalidated statutes that limited or
prohibited payment to circulators, see Ficker v. Montgomery County Bd of Elections, 670
F. Supp. 618, 621 (D. Md. 1985) (following Valeo in holding that a ban on payment of
circulators is invalid as unduly trenching on rights of political speech), and Hardie v. Eu,
556 P.2d 301, 304 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a statute limiting payment to 25g cents per
signature is an unjustified restriction of First Amendment speech rights under Valeo
rationale).
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enjoyed adequate grassroots support, concluding that the existing
requirement that a petition garner a specified number of signatures
before appearing on the ballot5 6 addressed that concern. 7 Colorado
also maintained that the prohibition guarded against the possibility
that paid circulators would more likely succumb to corruption than
their unpaid counterparts.5 8 The Court responded that Colorado had
presented no evidence showing that paid circulators were more prone
to fraud than volunteers;159 moreover, existing provisions imposing
criminal sanctions on fraudulent circulators adequately safeguarded
the process. 60
In Burdick v. Takushi, 6' the Court followed the reasoning of
Rosario and Storer in upholding a state election regulation while
elaborating on the process of balancing states' interests against
citizens' rights. 62 At issue in Burdick was Hawaii's prohibition of
write-in voting. 63 The Court concluded that burdening a citizen's
right to vote does not necessarily subject a provision to heightened
scrutiny, noting that "to require that [every voting] regulation be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest ... would tie
the hands of States seeking to assure that elections are operated
equitably and efficiently."'164 Borrowing from the test enunciated in
Anderson, the Court explained that courts must measure the degree
to which the state election law encroaches on the First Amendment
rights of citizens in order to determine what analysis to apply; if the
burden on rights is "reasonable [and] nondiscriminatory," then the
state's interest in regulating elections usually warrants the provision,
156. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2) ("[S]ignatures by registered electors in an
amount equal to at least five percent of the total number of votes cast for all candidates
for the office of secretary of state at the previous general election shall be required to
propose any measure by petition .... "); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-105 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1987).
157. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425-26. For a critique of this conclusion, see supra note 33.
158. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 426.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 427. Critics of the Court's reasoning argue that the Court incorrectly
viewed Colorado's bans on payment of circulators and circulator fraud as aimed at
regulating individual conduct. See Lowenstein & Stem, supra note 8, at 184-85. This view
facilitated a traditional First Amendment approach to the challenged statute. See id The
critics assert, however, that the statute is designed mainly to control the state's conduct-
the conditions under which Colorado will allow initiatives to get on the ballot-and,
therefore, the law is not particularly amenable to First Amendment review. See id.
161. 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
162. See id. at 437.
163. See id. at 430.
164. Id. at 433.
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and strict scrutiny is inappropriate.165 State election laws that create
merely reasonable burdens are presumed to be valid. 66 The Court
considered Hawaii's ban on write-in voting a relatively mild
infringement on voters' First Amendment rights and determined that
Hawaii's interest in preventing party raiding and factionalism
outweighed voters' concerns.167
The Court in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission'68 applied
exacting scrutiny to strike down a prohibition on distributing
anonymous campaign handbills, an activity that the Court held to be
core political speech.'69 Ohio argued that its interest in deterring libel
and fraud justified the law, but the Court concluded that other
existing regulations addressed the concern.7 In the Court's view, the
ban on anonymous election literature was overbroad because it
prohibited dissemination of documents that in no way could be
construed as fraudulent.'7' The McIntyre Court did allow for the
possibility that a more circumscribed identification requirement
would be constitutional, but the Court did not elaborate on that
point.72 Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
criticized what he called the Court's discovery of a "hitherto unknown
right-to-be-unknown while engaging in electoral politics."'73 Justice
Scalia also found fault with the majority's application of strict
scrutiny, especially in light of the Court's announcement that a more
limited statute might be constitutional. 4
The flexible standard developed in Anderson and Burdick guided
the Court in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party,7 ' which further
established the states' authority to regulate elections. 6 As in Storer,
165. Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S.780, 788 (1983)).
166. See id. at 441.
167. See id. at 439. For a thoughtful analysis of the Burdick Court's announced test,
see Alan Brownstein, How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in
Constitutional Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 867, 917-19 (1994).
168. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
169. See id. at 336, 347.
170. See id. at 349-50.
171. See id. at 351.
172. See id. at 353 ("We recognize that a State's enforcement interest might justify a
more limited identification requirement, but Ohio has shown scant cause for inhibiting the
leafletting at issue here.").
173. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at 380 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia stated that the strict scrutiny
test, in which a statute must be "narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest," is
"ordinarily the kiss of death." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
176. See id. at 358. The Court stated that "[r]egulations imposing severe burdens on
plaintiffs' rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser
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Timmons involved a statute that regulated candidates' ballot access:
Minnesota law prohibited a candidate from running a "fusion"
candidacy in which the candidate's name would appear on the
election ballot as the candidate for multiple parties. 77 Pursuant to
this law, Minnesota barred a minor political party from listing on the
ballot a candidate who already had been sponsored by another
political party.178 The minor party sued the State, asserting that its
ban on fusion candidacies violated the party's First Amendment right
of association.179  The Court determined that the minor party's
associational rights were not severely burdened because Minnesota's
laws only ruled out as candidates those who were already running for
another party.180 Therefore, Minnesota did not need to establish
compelling state interests, but merely needed to show interests
sufficient to outweigh the burden on the party's rights. 18 ' The Court
held that Minnesota's interests in preventing exploitation of fusion
candidacies"S and in promoting party stability',' outweighed the
party's rights of association.'1 4
During the final three decades of the twentieth century, the
Court's application of its gradually evolving, evaluative framework 85
for these campaign regulation cases has led to inconsistent holdings.
In Kusper and Rosario, both written by Justice Stewart, the Court
used disparate standards of review to evaluate similar voter
burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State's 'important regulatory
interests' will usually be enough to justify 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.' "
Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v.
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,789 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
177. See id. at 353-54.
178. See id. at 354. Andy Dawkins was running unopposed in the Minnesota
Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party's primary for a state-elected office; respondent New
Party chose Dawkins as its candidate for the same office in the November general
election. See id
179. See id at 355.
180. See id. at 363.
181. See iL at 363-64.
182. See id- at 365-66. Minnesota argued that minor parties could nominate a popular
major-party candidate and, thus, in future elections more easily gain established ballot
access than the more difficult process of obtaining the requisite number of petition
signatures. See id at 366.
183. See id. at 366-69. The majority reasoned that states' interests allow them to take
steps to regulate elections in ways that tend to favor the two-party system and attenuate
the effects of factionalism. See id. at 367. Cf. Tm FEDFRALIST No. 10 (James Madison)
(discussing problems of factionalism). Justice Stevens, in dissent, asserted that an interest
in maintaining a two-party system is not a sufficient justification to allow Minnesota to
keep the fusion ban. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 377-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. See Timmons, 520 U.S. at 369-70.
185. For an outline of this framework, see supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text.
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registration rules, both of which purported to achieve the same
regulatory goal.186 The Valeo Court announced an "exacting
scrutiny"'1 7 test to evaluate disclosures of campaign contributions yet
proceeded to apply an intermediate level of scrutiny.188 Moreover,
while in Valeo the Court stated a high standard and then lowered it,
the Anderson Court did just the opposite: after enunciating a
balancing test for which Ohio's interests would normally suffice to
justify "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions[,]" the Court
applied the test in a manner akin to heightened or strict scrutiny,
because the Court found that the regulation discriminated against
independent candidates." 9 As a result of these inconsistencies, the
Court's framework for assessment of election laws makes it difficult
to predict the outcome of potential controversies. The case-by-case
approach to non-speech election cases embraced by Storer and
Anderson, in which courts are to balance the burden on citizens'
rights against states' regulatory interests, does not send a clear signal
to the lower courts or potential litigants. The Storer Court explicitly
admitted the unpredictable nature of its test,9 ' and nine years later
the Court in Anderson did little to improve the test's clarity. 19'
186. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,59-60 (1973); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S.
752, 762 (1973); Brownstein, supra note 167, at 896-98 (concluding that Kusper applied a
higher standard of scrutiny than Rosario).
187. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per curiam).
188. See Stone, supra note 138, at 62 (concluding that the Valeo Court applied
intermediate scrutiny).
189. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,788 (1983). The Court determined that the
March filing deadline for independent presidential candidates "places a particular burden
on... Ohio's independent-minded voters." Id. at 792. In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist,
writing for three other Justices, argued that the deadline merely requires a candidate to
decide in March whether to file as an independent or seek nomination as her party's
candidate and, thus, prevents independents from getting two shots at the November ballot.
See id. at 811 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1869 n.175 (1996) (stating that the Anderson Court applied strict
scrutiny); William E. Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little People, and the Supreme Court:
The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 757, 765 n.43 (1986) (observing that the Court applied heightened scrutiny because
the viewpoint-neutral state regulation had a disproportionately large effect on
independent candidates); Peter H. Shuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering
and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 COLUM. L. Ruv. 1325, 1339 n.63 (1987) (noting that
the Court applied heightened scrutiny because independent candidates' interests were
involved).
190. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724,730 (1974). The Court wrote, "[w]hat the result
of this process will be in any specific case may be very difficult to predict with great
assurance." Id.; see also Brownstein, supra note 167, at 915-16 (noting that Storer applied
a poorly defined "mixture of strict scrutiny and a more indeterminate balancing test").
191. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788-89. The Court stated that "[tihe results of this
evaluation will not be automatic; as we have recognized, there is 'no substitute for the
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Buckley follows a line of cases in which the deciding factor is the
nature of the test that the Court applies to evaluate the state's
interests. Although the Buckley majority chose strict scrutiny without
announcing it, the dissenters would have chosen a less demanding test
for Colorado's regulatory interests,192 one that requires that the
provisions merely satisfy "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions."'193 Generally, when the Court applies the reasonableness
test, the state's interests prevail. 94 Conversely, an application of strict
scrutiny usually results in an invalidation of the state's election
regulation.'95 Regardless of the manner in which the Justices reached
their conclusions in Buckley, the majority's choice of strict scrutiny
virtually ensured the invalidation of the Colorado election
requirements at issue,196 while the dissenting Justices' choice of the
reasonableness standard would have allowed the requirements to
stand. 97
In making its ruling, the Buckley Court determined that it was
hard judgments that must be made.'" Id (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730); see also
Brownstein, supra note 167, at 917 (interpreting Anderson as announcing three tiers of
scrutiny).
192. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 653-54 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part); id. at 659 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
193. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788.
194. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 396 (1997)
(upholding a ban on multiple-party ballot appearance); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
442 (1992) (upholding Hawaii's prohibition of write-in voting); Storer, 415 U.S. at 746
(upholding provision regarding candidate-party affiliation); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 762 (1973) (upholding a restriction on voter registration); Biddulph v. Mortham,
89 F.3d 1491, 1493 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding titling and single-subject requirements for
initiative petitions because they do not burden core political speech and are content
neutral); Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 293-94 (6th Cir.
1993) (upholding procedures to check signatures on petitions). But see Anderson, 460 U.S.
at 789-806 (application of a newly announced balancing test led the Court to strike down a
state law).
195. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Conn'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (voiding a
prohibition on anonymous campaign literature); Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428 (1988)
(invalidating a ban on paying ballot-petition circulators); Citizens Against Rent Control v.
City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) (voiding Berkeley, California's limit on
contributions to groups supporting or opposing ballot measures); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51, 60-61 (1973) (striking down a restriction on voter party affiliation). But see
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (upholding a ban on any campaign-related
activity within 100 feet of polling place entrances and stating that "[this] is the rare case in
which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny"); Austin v. Michigan, 494 U.S. 652,
654-55 (1990) (upholding under strict scrutiny a Michigan ban on corporate expenditures
on state election campaigns); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976) (per curiam)
(applying strict scrutiny, yet upholding a requirement of campaign finance disclosure).
196. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 648.
197. See id. at 658 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 659 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
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bound to follow the precedent of Meyer, which, if taken to its logical
conclusion, would invalidate any state regulation that decreases the
quantity of political speech in the ballot-petition process."9 ' In
addressing the challenged statutes in Buckley, however, the Court
assumed that a residency requirement for circulators would be
constitutional and relied on that assumption in invalidating
Colorado's circulator registration provision as unconstitutional.'99
Yet, in a strict Meyer framework, there appears to be no clear
distinction between the registration and residency requirements: to
uphold either one would decrease the pool of potential circulators,
thereby reducing the quantity of core political speech and decreasing
the possibility that an initiative would get on the ballot?0
Accordingly, both the registration and residency requirements should
be subject to strict scrutiny under the reasoning in Meyer.201 The
Buckley Court's presumption that a residency requirement for
circulators would be constitutional serves to highlight the fact that the
standards applied by the Buckley and Meyer Courts were actually
different. This discrepancy may signal that the Court is retreating
from Meyer's harsh stance toward state regulation of petitioners. 2
Additionally, one may conclude that the Court in Buckley
applied less than strict scrutiny to Colorado's regulations.2 3 This
conclusion is bolstered by the Court's use of the phrase "substantial
interests," a term that usually denotes intermediate scrutiny, in
describing Colorado's aims in regulating the initiative process.204 In
198. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425 (declaring that the burden the state must overcome to
justify such a regulation is "well-nigh insurmountable").
199. The Court stated that "assuming that a residence requirement would be upheld as
a needful integrity-policing measure ... the added registration requirement is not
warranted." Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 645.
200. See id. at 643-44 (concluding that the registration requirement is invalid under
Meyer).
201. The same argument applies to the badge provision. The Court discarded the
name requirement, but did not rule on the constitutionality of requiring other badge
information: the circulator's paid or volunteer status and the name of the employer of a
paid circulator. See hi. at 645. Both parts of the badge requirement would deter some
potential circulators from participating in the petition process and would therefore restrict
political speech in the same manner as would both the residency and registration
provisions.
202. See supra note 198 and accompanying text (noting Meyer's language).
203. See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text (describing Justice Thomas's
assertion that the Buckley Court applied less than strict scrutiny).
204. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 647-48. Justice Ginsburg referred to the Valeo Court's
upholding of disclosure requirements as "substantially related to important governmental
interests." Id. at 647. In the present case, Justice Ginsburg deems portions of Colorado's
disclosure requirement as responding to a "substantial state interest," while other portions
are "no more than tenuously related to... substantial interests." Id. at 647-48.
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Buckley, Justice Ginsburg may have avoided announcing the Court's
standard of scrutiny to send a signal that states may still attempt to
regulate the ballot-petition process without undue fear that the Court
will subject all challenged provisions to strict scrutiny.205 In so doing,
the Buckley Court, while staying within the strictures of Meyer, may
be narrowing the seemingly expansive scope of the Meyer holding.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist discussed in his dissent in Buckley,
the Court's decision in the case has potentially substantial
ramifications, especially for states concerned about curbing the
excesses of the direct legislation tools of initiative and referendum."
Commentators have criticized the Court's decisions in election and
campaign cases such as Meyer and Buckley, which, purporting to
further the democratization of direct legislation, actually have
lessened democracy by enabling relatively few individuals-often the
wealthy and influential-to control more easily the initiative and
referendum processes.' Furthermore, direct legislation petitions
tend to focus on issues that special interest groups find vital but that
rarely concern a large number of citizens.08
205. This proposition is supported by Justice Ginsburg's modification of established
standards in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996). In that case, the United
States alleged that the Virginia Military Institute's refusal to admit female students was a
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 519. In
an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court purported to apply intermediate
scrutiny to review the state-funded school's all-male policy, but held that those defending
gender-based government action must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for
that action. Id. at 531. This language appears to represent a standard closer to strict
scrutiny than to intermediate scrutiny. See Jon Gould, The Triumph of Hate Speech
Regulation: Why Gender Wins but Race Loses in America, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 153,
214 (1999) (noting the inconsistency between the purported level of scrutiny and the
Court's use of the phrase "exceedingly persuasive justification").
206. See Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 659 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). For discussions of the
problems direct legislation can pose to the democratic process, see Emily Calhoun,
Initiative Petition Reforms and the First Amendment, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 129, 136 (1995)
(powerful special interest groups often dominate direct legislation processes); Eule, supra
note 1, at 1526-27 (the initiative procedure affords no opportunity for debate on or
modification of propositions); Magleby, supra note 1, at 18 (initiatives and referendums
are outside of constitutional checks and balances).
207. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text (describing the large moneyed
interests that operate in the initiative industry as well as the difficulties of the poorly
educated in participating in direct democracy).
208. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 1863; Magleby, supra note 1, at 35; Herbert
Hovenkamp, Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice, 57 U. Cm. L. REv. 63, 86-87
(1990) (observing that small, well-organized special-interest groups outperform large
interest groups with diverse agendas).
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To protect their citizens from at least some of the ill effects of
initiative petitioning, Colorado and other states must continue to seek
constitutional means to regulate the process. Although the Court
struck down Colorado's three challenged provisions, the State could
find less controversial ways to convey vital information about
petitions to voters at the meaningful moment when voters decide
whether to sign the petitions. In Meyer, the Court found that
Colorado's interest in policing petitioners' conduct was satisfied
adequately by a provision that required on each petition signatory
page prominent warnings against forging signatures and signing
without understanding the petition.2 9
Colorado may be able to extend that provision by requiring that
each signatory page also contain information about the proponents of
the petition, the amount of funds the proponents have spent, and the
paid or volunteer status of the circulator 0 Such a provision may be
constitutional because it would be significantly less intrusive of
circulators' rights than the nametag requirement. The circulator
would be able to conduct the "one-on-one, communicative aspect of
petition circulation"211 without interruption. The circulator then
would allow the voter to read the information about the petition on
the signatory page before deciding whether to sign. Such an
arrangement would prove an acceptable compromise among the
rights of petition proponents, circulators, and voters because it would
separate in time, albeit only slightly, the circulator's conveyance of
political speech from the voter's receipt of meaningful financial and
other information about the petition. The separation of time here
appears to be a" 'matter of degree' ",213 that the Court may determine
209. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,427 (1988).
210. Some states already have statutes that require some or all of this information on
each petition signature page. For example, Arizona's law states:
Each petition sheet shall have printed in capital letters in no less than twelve
point bold-faced type in the upper right-hand comer of the face of the petition
sheet the following:
paid circulator volunteer
A circulator of an initiative petition shall state whether he is a paid circulator
or volunteer by checking the appropriate line on the petition form before
circulating the petition for signatures.
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-102B, -102C (West 1998); see also CAL. ELEC. CODE § 101
(West 1999) (imposing a similar requirement); OR. REV. STAT. § 250.045(5)(b)(B) (1999)
(same).
211. Buckley, 119 S. Ct. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
212. See id at 645.
213. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330,348 (1972)).
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to be on the constitutional side of the line.
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